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LECTURE BY PROF. WOODWARD.
At the meeting of the Allison Society
held on Friday evening, February 17,
Professor Woodward delivered a lecture
on "Statutory Limitations of Freedom of
Contract Between Employer and EmAfter calling attention to the
ploye."
large number of "labor laws" so-called,
which have within recent years been enacted in the United States, he said that
the most important and far-reaching statutes might-be classified as follows: First,
"Anti-Truck '| or "Store Order" laws.
Second, "Fines Laws," which prohilit
the imposing of fines for imperfections in
work. Third, "Weekly Payment Laws".
Fifth,
Fourth, "Eight Hours Laws."
laws which prohibit employers to require
that their employes shall not belong to
any labor union or similar organization.
He said that the constitutionality of these
laws had been frequently assailed, upon
the ground that they interfere with freedom of contract between employer and
employe, and therefore deprive them of
the rights of "property" and "liberty"
granted by the Constitution of the United
States, and the several states. Prof.
Woodward took the position that the
statutes are not repugnlant to tile constitutional provisions referred to, because they
are a valid exercise of the police power of
the State. He discuk-ed the nature and

scope of the police power at length, and
maintained that in its exercise a state
legislature may place any limitation upon
freedom of contract which may be deemed
necessary for the protection of one class of
persons against the oppression of another
class. The conditions leading to the enactment of the statutes in the various
states were then examined by the lecturer,
the great and growing evils which the
statutes are designed to remedy were
clearly presented; and the leading cases
bearing upon the subject reviewed and
criticised.
W. J. Shearer, Esq., of the Cunlberland
County Bar gave an interesting lecture
before the Allison Society at the second
meeting of the term. The subject of the
lecture was the case of Commonwealth of
Pa. v. Sloan, one of the most remarkable
criminal cases that ever came before the
courts of this state. The defendant, who is
now living, declares at this day that he is
guilty, although, Mr. Shearer who was his
counsel, showed conclusively that it was
in)possible for him to have committed the
crime.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
I t is most gratifying to note the continned interest evinced at each meeting of
time Society. The mnembers of the Execu
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tive Committees have proved themselves
most efficient and untiring in providing
most excellent programs.
On Friday evening, January 27, the following program was rendered:Recitation-Miss Julia A. Radle.
Oration-Mr. Samuel B. Hare.
Debate:-Resolved that Immigration
shall be further restricted by law in the
United States. The speakers for the affirmative were Messrs. Oiler and Clark; for
the negative, Messrs. Buck and Mearkle.
Each and every one of the debaters handled
his subject in an able, forcible and entertaining manner.
Mr. Brightbill, of the Cumberland
County Bar, and Messrs. Weeks and Coles,
of the Dickinson Law School, who sat as
judges, decided in favor of the negative.
The meeting on February 10, was one of
those delightful occasions, when the members of the Society are instructively entertained through the kindness of some one of
the able corps of instructors of the Dickinson Law School. At this time, George
Edward Mills, LL. B., one of the most
popular instructors in the School, delivered
a practical lecture on "Divorce," to an attentive and appreciative body of students.
The intense interest which the Society is
manifesting in Parliamentary Law, is a
step forward in the right direction. The
members are to be heartily congratulated
upon their determination to ever "Forward! March!" It is this spirit of progression and alertness that has made for the
Dickinson Society the reputation of which
she is justly proud.
On the evening of February 10, George
Coles was elected president, the term of
Mr. Sheeline having expired.
At a recent meeting of the Dickinson
Society a committee consisting of Messrs.
MacEwen, Sebring and Collins was appointed to make investigation and submit
a report at an early meeting recommending such alterations and amendments of
the Constitution and By-Laws as they
deemed advisable.
This step is commendable.
While undoubtedly the present Constitution and
By-Laws were sufficient for the Society at
its inception and during its early youth,
the great increase in membership that has
,come with the past two years, and the difference in the work done then and now

make it entirely inadequate for the present
time.
The committee, we understand, have
finished their labors, and are prepared to
make their report. We have no doubt
that after the proposed changes have been
canvassed and passed upon by the society
it will have a set of regulations second to
none possessed by any society of our institution.
THE SCHOOL.
Devall has been elected captain of the
basket-ball team of the college. Being a
captain,seems to be Devall's hobby. He
was captain of the baseball and lootball teams during the past season, and is
now at the head of the basket-ball organization.
Samuel B. Hare, the eloquent orator of
the school, is instructing a class, composed
of law men, in the art of elocution.
Thomas Pepper, '98, was a recent visitor
to the school. He contemplates early admission to the New Jersey bar.
Francis Lafferty, '98, has opened offices
at 207 Market street, Camden, N. J. He
is picking up a very gratifying practice.
Our already large and handsome library,
has recently been enhanced in value, by
the addition of the Kentucky and Wisconsin state reports. To these will shortly
be added the Connecticut and Vermont
state reports. The library of this school,
is one well worthy of pride, and is a
source of great satisfaction to the fellows,
in looking up the law. With the advantages of a library such as this one is,
always at his command, no man ought to
leave Dickinson School of Law, without
having derived a first-class legal education.
Walter L. Hauck has been chosen Secretary of the Republican Standing Committee of Cumberland County. As this
is a very important position, the members
of the committee displayed great wisdom
in choosing a man of such pre-eminent
qualities to fulfill the duties of the office.
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Line and Wetzel, '98, had their first experience as practitioners, at the recent
term of court, when both appeared as
counsel in several cases. They performed
their duties with very great credit and
success.
J. R. Campbell, 196, of Kane, was in
town recently.
W. Harrison Walker, '96, has been nominated by the Democrats of Lock Haven,
for the position of Borough Auditor.
The Junior Class has been having
monthly examinations in Bailments under Prof. Sadler.
A large number of the fellows attended
the very interesting and entertaining exercises held in Bosler Hall, in commemoration of the birth of Waslington. These
exercises are generally of such a character
that the law school should have some representation in them. The exercises are in
commemoration of an event of public interest. The law students are just as strong
patriots, as are the college men; the standing of the two institutions is on an equality; and nothing is fairer, than that The
college should extend the courtesy of an
invitation to the law school, requesting
the presence of a representation on this
and similar occasions.
Gabriel H. Moyer, Esq., who graduated
fom Dickinson School of law last year,
left this afternoon for Lebanon where he
will practice his profession. "Gabe" is popular, is an able speaker, and we predict
for him a bright future as a lawyer. His
many friends are sorry to see him leave,
but wish him a prosperous career.-Carlisle Sentinel.

MOOT COURT.
WILLIAM YOUNG vs. CAMDEN
ELECTRIC R. R. CO.
Neglq ncC of employe-Trevpass.
C. H. BucK and -1. P. CONLEY for
plaintiff.
Company is liable for the negligent acts
of its employes, when employee is acting
within scope of his authority.-P. W. &

B. R. R. Co., v. Bramey, 17 W. N. C. 227;
Hays v. M\iller, 77 Pa., 238.
The act of Samuel Young going on the
dam, does not constitute trespass, as there
was implied invitation on part of railway
company to permit him to skate on the
pond.-Powers v. Hairlow, 53 Mich. 507,
Humphreys v. Co. of Armstrong, 56 Pa.
204.
Co~MREY and RUEFFER for defendant.
The owner of property is not liable to a
trespasser, or to one who is on the property by mere suffrance for negligence of
himself or servants.-Gillis v. P. R. R. Co.
59 Pa. 129; Knight v. Albert, 6 Barr. 472.
There was no contract relation which imosed any duties on the defendants. R.
Co. v. Skinner, 7 Harris, 298; Sygo v.
Newbote, 7 Exch. 302.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The Camden Street Railway Company
is a corporation owning and managing a
park in connection with its railway for
the purpose of increasing its revenues. On
this property is a dan, used in winter to
skate upon. On January 1, 1898, the 14year-old son of the plaintiff, Wm. Young,
walked to the park, and was informed by
the overseer of the pond, an employee of
the company, the ice was, he believed,
safe. As a result of this information the
boy went upon the pond, broke through
and was drowned. This action is brought
by the father of the deceased to recover the
damages suffered.
The chief ground of objection to the recovery by the plaintiff is that the son
walked to the park. It is immaterial bow
he got there; whether he walked, went
on ihe street cars, or by some other mode
of conveyance. The gravamen of this action is the failure of the defendant to use
proper care to protect the deceased from
danger on its premises while he was there
by the defendant's invitation, express or
implied. The boy was on the grounds by
an implied invitation of the company to
use its pond. Richmond and Manchester
Railroad Company, v. Moore, 37 L. R. A.
258.
"When one invites another either expressly or by implication to come upon
his premises, whether for business or any
other purpose, it is his duty to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting him into.
danger and to that end must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the
premises reasonably safe for the visit."
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Cooly onl Torts, p. 718. Greater precautions must be taken in the case of children.
R. R. v. Stout 84 U. S. 657.

The company employed an overseer to
watch the pond and prevent accident.
Had he been competent and free from
negligence, he would likely have noticed
that the ice was not sufficiently strong,
since a 14-year-old boy broke through.
The defendant is liable for any negligence
of its employees, (Remak v. Quilter, 2
Forum 32), who must be competent and
reliable. 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law
1020.
We think the plaintiff has made out a
case sufficient to go to the jury. This was
allowed and a recovery sustained in a
similar case, where a boy visited the park
of a railway company to view a baloon ascension open to the public, and was injured by the fall of a pole which upheld
the.balloon while being inflated. Richmond & Manchester Railway Co. v. Moore,
37 L. R. A. 258.
The court therefore refuses to charge the
jury as requested "that under all the evidence in the case the verdict must be for
the defendant."

CHARLOTTE DUDDA v. EUGENE
COURTRIGHT.
Tre,,ass againsta Sheriff-Applicationof
act of Mfay 26, 1897-Sheriff takes upon
himself the risk of property selling under
a judgment.
HARE and BosLER for plaintiff.
FLANIGAN

and HARTMAN for defend-

ant.
Ludwig Dudda and his wife Charlotte,
were in possession of a farm by virtue of a
lease made to them both. In working this
farm the business on which was conducted
by Ludwig, he used certain horses, cows,
wagons, etc., to the value of $300. Charles
Will having obtained a judgment against
Ludwig Dudda, with waiverof exemption
issued an execution. On July 29th, 1898,
the sheriff, Courtright, levied on the
property in the possession of Ludwig Dudda, selling it on August 8th, as the property
of Ludwig Dudda. Before the sale Charlotte Dudda by her attorney notified the

sheriff that she was owner of the goods.
and forbade him to make sale ofsame,under
penalty of damages. Thereupon, Charles
Will gave the sheriff a bond of indemnity,
and the sale was proceeded with. The
sheriff, Charlotte Duddta.their counsel, all
persons connected with the execution sale,
were ignorant of the act of May 26th, 1897,
P. L. 95. The sheriff did not demand, nor
did Mrs. Dudda pay the four dollars required by the seventh section of that act.
She did not ask for nor did the sheriff petition for an interpleader. On November 1st,
1898, Charlotte Dudda brought this trespass against the sheriff to recover the value
of her property. Defendant asks for a
non-suit, because the plaintiff did not comply with the seventh section of the act of
May 26th, 1893.
That the sheriff is a trespasser, if he
levies upon and sells, under an execution
against A, the property of X, is indisputable. He takes the risk upon himself, of
properly selecting the property of the defendant in the judgment, and he may insist, as in this case he did, upon a bond of
indemnity from the plaintiff in the ft. fa.
If he is made answerable to the person
whose property he has seized instead of
the defendant's, lie may obtain indemnification by a suit upon this bond. Here
however, he is denying his liability even to
the owner whose property he has thus
taken.
The sheriff may also, instead of proceeding with his execution without any protection, or without accepting a bond of indemnity from the plaintiff, obtain a rule
upon the claimant of the goods, or the execution creditor, in order that before sale,
the ownership thereof may be judicially
determined. Act April 10th, 1848; 1 P. &
L. 1950.
The act of May 26th, 1897, is intended
more strictly to regulate the proceeding.
It provides, that, when (1) a claim to the
goods by a stranger is made, the sheriff
may (2) enter a rule to show cause why an
issue should not be framed. If (3) the
court makes the rule absolute an issue is
framed, .10, and the claimant must (4) give
a bond conditioned to maintain his title to
the goods or pay their value to the execution creditor. Thereupon (5) the sheriff
delivers the goods to the claimant. a, 2,
3, 4, 5. In order to obtain some guide to
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the value of the goods, in case the claimant has to pay it, 8, there must be (6) an
appraisement, by appraisers appointed by
the sheriff. The cost of the appraisement,
viz: $4 must (7) be paid "by the claimant at
the time of making his claims," if the
goods have been found by the sheriff in
possession of the defendant in the ft. fa.;
but by the plaintiff in the ft. fa., if found
in the possession of some other person.
Failure by the claimant thus to pay,' 'shall
be treated as an abandonment of the right
to have the goods and chattels themselves,'
failure by the plaintiff, as an abandonmentofthelevy. The claimant's bond, and
statement must be filed within two weeks
after the sheriff's rule is made, absolute 11.
The court may dispense with the bond, on
the motion of the plaintiff in theft. fa. and
cause the goods to be sold; requiring their
proceeds to be brought into court, for distribution, according as the issue shall be
determined. If the bond having been
given, the goods have been taken by the
claimant, a judgment for their value is
entered against him,
13. If the sheriff
complies with the act, he shall be free
from all liability to the claimant, etc., 15.
The sheriff's exemption from his common law liability, depends on his complying with the provisions of this act. Has
he complied? He was seemingly ignorant
of the existence of the act. It is certain
that he has not complied with it. He did
not "enter a rule in the court out of which
said execution or process issued." That,
after the notice to him by the claimant, is'
the initial act, after which all the other
steps are to be taken.. His liability at
common law continues.
It is supposed that the failure to pay $4,
as appraisement fee, has taken from the
claimant her right of action. It would be
absurd to require the claimant to pay $4
before the sheriff has entered his rule in
court, or before, by giving the bond, the
claimant indicates his intention to require
the sheriff to deliver the goods to him, 2.
The bond is one act, which the claimant
must do, to entitle him to the sheriff's
surrender of the possession of the goods.
The payment of the appraisal fee is another.
The appraisement has absolutely no value
unless the claimant gets the goods. The
bond is required for security for the payment by the claimant, of the value of the

IOI

goods. The appraisement is required as a
means of identifying the goods and ascertaining their value. We think it clear
that the bond and the $4 are to betendered
together, and after the court has made the
rule absolute. They are to be tendered, in
order to recover manual possession of the
goods. They are to be tendered when that
possession is claimed. It would be foolish
to require the $4 for the appraisement, to
be made before even a rule was asked for
by the sheriff, while the bond, which was
an equally indispensable condition of the
delivery of the goods to the claimant, was
not required until the rule had been made
absolute. Both the bond and the appraisal money were requisite to obtain the possession, which the sheriff is not required to
surrender till atter the rule has been made
absolute.
The 7th section of the act declares the
consequence of the claimants' failure to
pay the $4. "It shall be treated as an
abandonment of the * 0 right to have the
goods and chattels themselves."
Under
this interpleader process, two things are
contemplated as alternately happening to
the goods levied on.
They may be returned to the claimant, or they may be
sold by the sheriff, and the proceeds paid
either to the claimant or to the execution
creditor, as the issue shall be determined
for the former or the latter. Their return
to the claimant is not possible if he doe.,
not give a bond, or, if he fails to pay the
appraisement money. But, the failure to
pay simply destroys the right to the return of the chattels and not the right to
their value. The plaintiff has lost both
the goods and their value. The price of
their sale has not been paid into court, but
to the execution creditor.
It is quite clear that the appraisement is
incidental to the delivery of the goods by
the sheriff to the claimant, and that the
duty of paying the $4 arises only whenafter
the rule has been made absolute, the claimant makes his claim for the delivery of the
possession to him. As no rule was ever
entered, or made absolute, as no demand
was made for delivery of the possession, in
conformity with the act, on the tender of
the bond and of the $4, the occasion never
arose, under which the tender of the $4
became a duty, or, under which the claimant obtained the option, as the law con-
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templated that he should, of getting back
the goods in specie, or of having the price
at which they should sell reserved, to
await the decision upon the issue.
We mlist therefore decline to enter the
judgment of non-suit.
JOSEPH DAVIS vs. CUMBERLAND
VALLEY R. R. Co.
_elease for tort- Torts of servants of charitable institutions.
CLARK

and

MEARKEL

for plaintiff.

A release is not to be extended beyond
the intention of the parties; nor beyond
the consideration for which it is given.Rapp v. Rapp, 6 Pa. 45; Naglee's Estate,
10 C. C. R., 525; Blair v. Railroad Co., 89
Mo. 383.
An association for the mutual benefit of
its supporters is not a charitable institution.-Swift v. Easton Beneficial Soc., 73
Pa. 362; Coe v. Washington Mills, 149
Mass. 543.
SEBRING

and

ALEXANDER.

for defend-

ant.
The release given satisfied all claims.
Eccles v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 48 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cases, 38; Ringle v. Pa. R.
R. Co., 164 Pa. 529.
This was a charitable institution and
was not liable for the torts of its servants.
-Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa.
624; Price v. Maxwell, 28 P. 23; Burd
Orphan Asylum v. School District, 90 Pa.,
21.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff in this case was an employee of the defendant company, and was
injured February 1898, by reason of the
negligence of the company. The company settled by giving the employee $500.
He executed a release to the company, in
which he set out that he released the company from "all claims and demands
whatsoever in law or equity, by reason of
any matter, cause, or thing whatever,
whether the same arose from contract or
tort; from the beginning of the world to
this day." This release was executed May
1st 1898. Between the date of the accident and the day of the release the employee had been kept at a hospital which
was jointly sustained by all the employees
G2 the road and the company for the
treatment of injured employees.
On
March 1st an operation was performed, and a piece of a lance was through

the negligence of the doctor, broken off and left in the leg. On the
day the release was executed the plaintiff
was discharged as fully recovered, none of
the parties being aware that the broken
lance remained in the leg. On September
1st, 1898, Davis's leg became inflamed, and
it was discovered that the broken lance
remained therein. Ry reason of it he has
become lamed for life. Henow sues to recover S1000 damages suffered.
The court affirmed two points for the
defendant.
1. The release given satisfied all claims.
2. The hospital was a charitable institution, and the company was not liable for
the mis-feasance of the officers thereof.
The supreme court is asked to reverse on
the ground of erroneous instructions.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The release given by the plaintiff to the
defendant in this case must be construed
by reference to what was contemplated by
the parties at the time of its execution. It
can help to embrace those things only
which were the subject matter of the release. It discharged the defendant from
no liability that was not intended by the
parties. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant on the day of its execution were
aware that a negligent physician had left
a broken lance in the leg of the former.
The release therefore could have had no
reference to this demand. This rule was
adopted in Rapp v. Rapp, 6 Pa. 45, and
has been uniformly accepted as the correct
doctrine since then.
But the unskillful physician was an employee of the hospital sustained by the
contributions of the defendant and its employees. It does not appear to have had
any endowment, but to have depended on
voluntary gifts. It was not operated for
profit or for gain. It was purely a charity,
and the fact that it was for the employees
of the Cumberland Valley Railroad does
rot alter the case. Burd Orphan Asylum
v. School District, 90 Pa. 21; Price v.
Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23. Such an institution
is not liable for the negligence of its employees. Fire Insurance Patrol of Philadelphia V. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624; McDonald
v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120
Mass. 432.
Besides the railroad and the hospital
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were different and independent organizations. While the former made voluntary
contributions to the mnuintenance of the
latter, it did not become thereby responsible for its defaults. For the negligence
of its physician the defendant was not
liable, nor can it be forced to respond in
damages for any injury suffered.
We are of the opinion therefore that the
court below was in error in affirming the
first point of the defendant, but correct in
affirming the second. As the plaintiff is
not entitled however to recover the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
IN RE SMITH'S ESTATE.
Petition of Trust Company, Trustee of
Marion Fletcher-Legateeis entitled to
accumulationfor one &.car.
W. E. SHEAFFER and KENNEDY attorneys for petitioner.
Pecuniary legacies bear interest from
the testator's death when they are for the
maintenance, education or support of the
castuis que trustent.-Townsend's Appeal,
106 Pa. 273; Cook v. Meeker, 36 N. Y. 15;
Seargeant's Appeal, 39 Phila. 346.
COREY and

H. M. BROOKS for the

respondent.
As the case at bar is a general legacy defendant cannot be compelled to pay interest for the first year subsequent to devisor's
death.-Hawkins on Wills, 301; Blackstone v. Blackson, 3 Watts 3.35; Hickwir's
Estate 2.5 W N. 67; Sibley v. Perry, 7
U. S. 5123; Walls v. Stewart, 4 Harris, 275.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On March Ist, 1896, Maitha Smith died
leaving a will in which she made a number
of bequests of money and stocks. To
Marion Fletcher "I bequeath ten shares of
Carlisle Street Railway Stock." On March
Ist, 1897, the executors filed their account.
The trust company, trustee of Marion
Fletcher presented this petition to the
court, praying for a rule on the executors
to show cause why they should not pay

over to them the stock with the dividends
and accumulations thereon. The answer
of the executors avers that they have
always been willing to deliver the stock,
but that the accumulations on the stock did
not belong to the bequest. The Court is
asked to direct that the executors pay over
the stock, and the accumulated dividends.

OPINION OF COURT.

It is well settled that the legatee of a
specific legacy is entitled to the accumulations and profits thereon from the date of
the testator's death. This, upon the theory
that such a legacy is separated by the testator from the general estate and appropriated to the legatee. If, then, the legacy
of ten shhres of Carlisle Street Railway
stock to Marion Fletcher is specific, the
dividends and accumulations in question
rightfully belong to her and the prayer of
the petitioner should be granted.
While it appears that the testatrix, in
her will, made a number of bequests of
"stocks," we are not informed whether or
not at the time of her death, she actually
owned more than ten shares of Carlisle
Street Railway stock. If she owned fifty
shares, the bequest 'to Marion Fletcher,
expressed as it was, would unquestionably
be regarded as general and not specific,
and even considering, as we may in this
case, that the ten shares bequeathed to
Marion Fletcher were all that the testatrix-owned at the time of her death, we
are of the opinion that the bequest is a
general one.
Owing to the danger that a specific legacy may be adeemed, the'courts are strongly inclined to constrde legacies to be general rather than specific. Reily v. Potter, 4
Vesey 478; Webster v. Hale, 8 Vesey 410;
Walls v. Stewart, 4 Harris 275; Eckfeldt's
Estate, 7 W. N. C. 19. And consequently
4t is said that a legacy of stock, of whatever denomination, is not prima *facie
specific, but is general, even though the
testator may have had stock of the description mentioned sufficient to answer the bequest. Hawkins on Wills, 301. In order
that the legacy may be regarded as specific
the identity of certain stock as the subject
matter of the legacy must be clearly established. Thus, if the testatrix in this case
had stated the number of the certificate of
stock which she intended to make the subject of her bequest to Marion Fletcher, it
would have been a specific bequest:-by
her death that particular stock would have
been separated from the general estate and
appropriated to the legatee. But the words
"I bequeath ten shares of Carlisle Street
Railway stock" utterly fails to fix the identity of the stock intended to be bequeathed.
Indeed, they do not even show that at the
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time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was the owner of any stock of that
company. And the mere fact that at the
time of her death, she happened to have
the stock, is not a ground upon which the
court can conclude that the bequest is
specific.-Robinson v. Addison, 2 Beav.
515; Eckfeldt's Estate, supra; Sponsler's
Appeal, 107 Pa. 95.
In Sponsler's Appeal, there were two bequests of fifteen shares of 'second preferred'
Cumberland Valley Railroad Stock, and it
appeared that at the date of the will and
subsequently to the time of his death, the
testator owned just thirty shares of that
stock. The court held the legacies to be
general, saying: "There is nothing in the
language used to individuate the stock
shares. Had he owned a thousand such
shares, any thirty would have answered
the bequests; so had he owned none, the
purchase of a like number, or their money
value, would have fulfilled the intent of
the testator."
The petition, so far as it asks for dividends and accumulations, must be denied.

S ATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Samuel Hazlett was a banker in Washington, Pa. He made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors on March 30, '98.
His liabilities far exceeded his assets. Few
people if any had any knowledge of his
precarious financial condition. As an assurance of this fact many good and prominent businessmen had made large deposits
with him just before the assignment.
William Hastings, a merchant, had two
accounts in Hazlett's Bank, one as Treasurer of the Ten Mile Plank Road, the other
his individual account. At the time of the
assignment, he had as Treasurer of said
road, $2300 and $100 of his own money in
said bank.
Mr. Hastings was not under any bond
and received a salary of $25 per year, which
about paid necessary expenses leaving no
consideration for his trouble.
The Ten Mile Turnpike Co., seek to recover the $2300 from Mr. Hastings. Said
Co. knew of the deposit with Hazlett's
Bank, but never in any way suggested to
Mr. Hastings that it be placed elsewhere.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

TEN MILE TURNPIKE CO. vs. WILLIAM HASTINGS.
Obligationof a treasurer:-Not liablefor
loss of deposit by insolvency of bank
when in company's name.
1. Action in assumpsit.
A. N. WALLACE and N. M. FRANTZ for
plaintiff.
When the funds have actually come
into the hands of the treasurer, he is lianle
for their safe keeping without regard to
whether he acted in good faith.-Nyce's
Estate, 5 W. and S. 256; Hemphill's Appeal, 6 Harris 306.
2. If he deposits the money in the bank
without consulting those interested, he is
liable if the bank becomes insolvent.Commonwealth v. McAlister, 28 Pa. 485,
91 Pa. 280.
H. W. RUSSELL and H. J. SHELLENBERGER for defendant.
1. A trustee is bound only to exercise
common skill, prudence and caution.Calhoun's Estate 6 Watts 185; NefPs Appeal, 57 Pa. 91; Fahnestook's Appeal, 104
Pa. 46.
A trustee who deposits trustmoney in a
bank of good repute is not liable for its loss
through insolvency of bank.-Lawn's Estate, 144 Pa. 500; Hammond v. Cottle, 6
S. & R. 290.

The defendant in this case was the
treasurer of the plaintiff corporation. His
ordinary duties as such were "to receive,
safely keep, and disburse under the supervision of the directors the funds of the
company."
The law requires that the
money be kept separate from his own.
The moneys were not received by him for
investment. It was not the duty of the
treasurer to do so, nor did he ever have
such authority. It was obligatory upon
him to be able and ready to pay over on
demand of the company the whole balance
in his hands. He was not therefore a
trustee in a technical definition of that
term. He was rather an agent or bailee.
It being incumbent upon him to pay over
the money whenever called for, it had to
be placed in some depositary from whence
it could be drawn by him when required.
Treasurers usually select a bank as their
place of deposit, and an account, was opened here in which receipts are credited and
disbursements charged. In selecting such
depositary Hastings was bound to apply
ordinary skill and diligence, such as a prudent and reasonabl6 man would exercise
in the conduct of his own affairs.
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It does not appear in the present case
that he had any reason to suspect the
solvency of Hazlett. "Many other good
and prominent business men made deposits
with the latter just before the assignment." The company knew the treasurer
was keeping the money there. The defendant was also keeping his own money
in the same institution.
Even had he been a trustee in the
strictest sense, he would have been justified in keeping current balances in a bank
which was generally trusted, and whose
solvency he had no reason to suspect, and
even sums for investment for a reasonable
time- not beyond three months. Barney
v. Sanders, 16 Howard 544. In this case
the deposit was with private bankers.
On the whole we do not think that
Hastings acted with such want-of'prudence
or discretion as to render him liable for the
loss of the moneys of the plaintiff by the
failure of the bank in which they were deposited by him, and the verdictmust therebe rendered in his favor.
THOMAS CONWELL vs. SAMUEL
MANNING.
Sale of typewriter-Alternate remediesWritten contract to be interpreted by
court.

Motion for new trial.
MERKEL LANDIS and S. H. MILLER
for plaintiff.
The contract between Conwell and Manning was manifestly one of sale; and the
right of the parties must be adjudged from
the interpretation of the contract by the
court.-Ott v. Sweatman, 166 Pa. 217;
Forrest v. Nelson, 108 Pa. 481; Edward's
Appeal, 105 Pa. 109; Farquhar v. McAboy,
142 Pa. 333.
The breach of the contract by Manning
leaves Conwell the option of either retaking the typewriter and keeping the money
already paid, or considering the whole
amount .due.-Appleton v. Norwalk Literary Corp., 53 Conn. 4.
B. JOHNSTON MACEWEN and L. Hix.DRETH for defendant.

The transaction between Conwell and
Manning was a bailmeut.-Rowe v.
Sharp, 51 Pa. 26; Henry & Co. v. Patterson, 57 Pa. 346; Christ v. Kleber, 79 Pa.
290; Enlow v.. Kline, 79 Pa. 488; Brown &
Co. v. Billington, 153 Pa. 76; and' neither
the giving of notes for the value of the
typewriter, nor the stipulation that upon

default the entire sum was to become due
and payable, changed the transaction into
a sale.-Bridgeport Organ Co. v. Guldin,
3 Dist. Rep. 649.
The contract Is ambiguous; and being so
must be construed in that manner which
appears the most reasonable and just.Bickford v. Cooper & Co., 41 Pa. 142; Lacy
v. Green, 84 Pa. 514.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Manning sent Conwell the following order:, PHILADELPHIA, APRIL

MY

1st, 1898.

DEAR IMR. CONWELL:-

Please ship me
at once one of your No. 27 typewriters. On
the fulfillment of the above I agree to pay
the sum of $5 cash, and the monthly sum
of $5 for twelve months, evidenced by
promissory notes payable monthly. I am
to have the privilege of purchasing said
typewriter, at the end of said term, by the
additional payment of $5, and until the
said purchase by me of the said typewriter
to belong to you and to be returned to you
upon the failure by me to make any of the
monthly payments or the said last payment. It is hereby expressly agreed and
understood that in default of said cash payment, or of any monthly payments, the
full amount shall become due and payable,
and all claims of representation and verbal
agreement, not herein embodied are
waived.
SAMUEL MANNING.
(Signed)
The said typewriter was shipped on the
2nd of April, 1898, and the cash payment
of $5 madeby Manning. Promisory notes
were given for the different monthly payments as well as for the last payment of
$5. On April 15th, 1898, Manning offered
to return the typewriter, but Conwell refused to take it. Manning then made default in the payment of the first note due
on Mkay 1st, 1898. Conwell brings suit for
the entire amount.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The contract between Conwell and Manning is in writing, and, for that reason the
interpretation of it is the function of the
court. Forrest v. Nelson, 108 Pa. 481.
What then, did Conwell and Manning
mean? Manning (1) orders a typewriter
from Conwell, and agrees (2) on the delivery of it, to pay $5 in cash, and $5
monthly for twelve months, and further
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(3) that he is to have the privilege of purchasing the typewriter at the end of the
year, on the payment of an additional $5.
He agrees, also, that until the "purchase"
the typewriter is to belong to Conwell, and
is to be returned to Conwell, should he fail
to pay any of the monthly, or the final installment of $5. He further agrees that in
default of the cash payment, or of any
monthly payments, the "full amount"
shall become due and payable. It is
stipulated also, that the duty of making
the monthly payments, shall be "evidenced by promissory notes, payable
monthly." At the signing of the contract,
Manning executed promissory notes not
only for the monthly payments, but also
for the final $5.
The parties to the litigation, are the
parties to the contract. Creditors of Manning are in no way concerned. No embarrassment arising from actual or constructive fraud on creditors, or the reservation of a lien despite the loss of possession, afflicts the inquiry. We think from a
comparison of the various members of the
stipulation, tliatthe partiesintended asale,
that Conwell reserved a right of repossession in case of default, in any of the payments; that he had also, a right to sue
upon the notes, in case of such default, and
that these rights were alternate and not
concurrent. Evidently the typewriter was
valued at $70. Manning proposed to pay
this anlount in installments, and to get
possession of the machine, as soon as the
first $5 was paid. He bound himself to
pay all the rest of the instalments unconditionally. Neither the contract, nor the
notes delivered by him, intimate that they
are conditioned on the retention of the
typewriter. The return stipulated for, was
to occur only on default, and because of tefault in payment, and was for the benefit
of Conwell. On the same default, it was
"expressly agreed" that the full amount
should become payable. Not a wi'ord is
said about a right in Manning before default, to return the machine, and thus
avoid his obligation upon the notes. We
cannot insert a stipulation of this sort into
the contract.
The duty of Manning to retain and pay
for the machine, was absolute. Conwell's
duty was to let him retain it, if he paid
for it. But, if'Manning failed to pay ac-

cording to the terms of the agreement,
then Conwell acquired the right either to
resume the -possession retaining what
sums lie had already received, or to permit the possession to remain with Manning, and to compel the latter to pay
agreeably to his promise. The right of
reversion of the possession was as plainly
Conwell's, and not Manning's, on Manning's default, as if it had been expressly
stated, as in Appleton v. Norwalk Library
Corporation, 5.3 Conn. 4, to be the option
of the vendor. It follows, that, as in that
case Appleton, the seller of books, so in
this case Conwell, the seller of a typewriter,
may,choosing not toretake the typewriter,
maintain an action on the notes. Cf.
Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn. 464: Bailey v..
Hervey, 135 Mass. 112.
When default is made by a vendee in
the payment of the price of the thing
bought, he cannot by tendering the thing
back liberate himself from paying any
portion of the purchase money. His obligation can be extinguished only by paying
in legal tender. The right to return the
thing, when it exists, is the product of the
contract. This contract is entirely silent
concerning any such right. It follows
that the court was right at the trial in allowing a recovery on the notes, despite the
offer to prove an attempt to return the
typewriter. The motion for a new trial is
over-ruled
JOHN CAVEN v. AMOS HIMLER.
Evidence-Suborningwitness- Tampering
with juror-Second trial.
Trespass.
D. EDWARD LONG and LEON C. PRNcE
for the plaintiff.
1. To make the evidence of James Mason material and admissible, in the examination in chief, jt must be clear that
the wife was'the authorized agent of the
husband. Simply showing the relationship will not establish, as a matter of law,
that the wife is the representative of the
husband. 9 Am. Eng.'Enc. 351; 1 Taylor
on Evidence, 675, 535; 2 Wharton on Evidence, 398: Bdtlkr v. Price, 115 Mass., 578:
Cont. Ins. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa. 225;
Rose v. Chapman, 44 Mich., 312.
2. The evidence of John Napes should
be excluded under the rule "All evidence
of collateral facts or those which are in-
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capable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference as to the principal
fact or matter in dispute should be rejected." 1 Wharton on Evidence 20; Kendall v. Lee, 2 P. & W., 482.
DANIEL R. REESE and B. FRANK FEN,.coN for the defendant.
Evidence is admissible to show the improper conduct of either party to the
cause.-Thomas v. Chapman, 45 (Barb.)
N. Y. 98; Am. & Eng. Enc., 276, 280; Heslop
v. Heslop, 82 Penna. 537; Egan v. Bowker,
87 Mass. 449.
If the plaintiff has produced false testinony, and his endeavored to have recourse to perjury, it is strong evidence that
lie knew perfectly well that his cause was
an unrighteous one.-Best on Evideice,
370, 373; Fitzpatrick v. Riley, 163 Pa. 65;
Statev. Hack, 118 Mo. 99; Am. & Eng.
Enc. 795; State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19;
Barkly v. Copeland, 86 Cal. 483.

the parties to an action show that at a
previous trial of the cause, the adverse
party attempted to corrupt witnesses or
jurors? Second, May he show that such
an attempt to corrupt witnesses or jurors
was made by the wife of the adverse party?
1. Upon principle, the first question
would seem to be one of some difficulty.
It has already been determined, however,
by the Supreme Court, the very recent
case of McHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197,
being precisely in point. In that case, the
action was to revive a judgment obtained
against the defendant's deceased husband,
of whom she was the executrix. The defence was-accord and satisfaction. In rebuttal the defendant offered to prove by
two witnesses, that before the first trial,
the defendant had attempted to induce
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
them to appear as witnesses for her and to
On 3rd January, 1894, Jacob Caven, son
testify falsely, and to prove by a third
of plaintiff, in the employ of Himler, was witness that the defendant had attempted
killed by a machine which he was workto induce him to corrupt the jurors. The
ing. Jacob Caven was a young man, 19 defendant objected to the admission of the
years old, but it being alleged by plaintiff testimony upon the ground that the facts
that the machine was not properly consought to be proven were collateral to the
structed, and that Himler had neglected
issue, and afforded no reasonable presumpto properly instruct the deceased in the tion or inference as to the principal matter
use df it.
in dispute; but on the contrary tended to
Atthis, the second trial, Himler offered
prejudice the jurors and to draw away
James Mason as a witness to prove that
their minds from the point in issue. The
in a former trial, the wife of plaintiff had testimony was admitted, however, and the
offered him $25 if he would testify favor- ruling sustained upon appeal, the court,
ably to the plaintiff. Himler also offered
after reviewing the authorities, concluding
John Napes, one of the jurors in the former
that "evidence of the misconduct of a
case, to prove that John Caven sent an
party in connection with the trial is adagent to him with an offer of a horse
missible as tending to show that the party
Worth $100 for $60, if he, Napes, would se- guilty of the misconduct is unwilling to
cure a verdict for him, Caven.
The
rely on the truth of his cause, or is conformer verdict was for the defendant, and scious that it is an unjust one."
was set aside by the court and a new trial
If such is, in truth, the tendency of eviawarded.
dence of misconduct, the correctness of
OPINION OF THE COURT.
the decision cannot be questioned. But is
The offers of the defendant to which the it the tendency? Is it not possible that the
plaintiff objects, are two in number. The
misconduct of the party may be traced to
first is to prove by James Mason that in a
other causes ? In the case at bar, is it not
former trial of the action, the wife of the quite conceivable that the plaintiff was
plaintiff offered him $25.00 if he would tes- led to his attempt to corrupt a juror, not
tify favorably to the plaintiff. The second
by want of confidence in his cause, but by
is to prove by John Napes, one of the want of confidence in the impartiality of
jurors at the former trial, that the plain- the juror? And in the face of such a postiff through his agent offered to sell to him
sibility, is it just to say that his misconduct
for $60, a horse worth $100, if he, Napes,
tends to show that he is "unwilling to rely
would secure a verdict for the plaintiff.
on the truth of his cause, or is conscious
The objection to these two offers raises
that it is an unjust one?" The field of
two distinct questions. First, May one of
discussion is a tempting one, but the de-
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cision of the Supreme Court forbids us to evidence against him.-Rex. v. Derringenter. We must be content to venture a ton, 2 C. and. P. 418; Com. v. Tuckerman,
10 Gray 173; Com. v. Goodwin, 186 Pa.
doubt as to the justice of its conclusion.
218.
2. The second question presents no
2. Legal imprisonment does not operdifficulty. Evidence of attempts to cor- ate to exclude a confession made during
rupt witnesses or jurors is admitted, as we its continuance, when no threats or promhave just seen, to show that the adverse ises are used.-Wharton's Criin. Ev.,
?.661; Com. v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181; Coni.
party is unwilling to rely on the truth of v. Smith, 119 Mass. 305: Com. v. Goodhis cause. The reason utterly fails to sup- win, 186 Pa. 218.
3. To exclude a voluntary confession
port an offer to show such attempts at
guilt some inducement must be held
corruption by one who is not a party to of
out to prompt to falsehood, and of this the
the action, or an authorized agent of a trial court must be the judge in the first
party. The fact that a friend of the plain- instance and their ruling will be set aside
tiff, or some person interested in the issue only for manifest error. -Com. v. Griffin.
of the controversy, such as a creditor of the 110 Mass. 181; Com. v. Houston. 8 Phila.
42q; Coni. v. Johnson, 162 Pa. 63.
plaintiff, lacks 'confidence in the result,
would be wholly irrelevant. And in the
STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
absence of evidence that the wife was auTyson was indicted and tried for arson,
thorized by her husband to make the at- When in jail, he wrote a letter to his wife
tempt at corruption, the relation of agency in which he refers to the arson, giving an
cannot be presumed. As Wharton says, account of the way in which it was done,
"A man may constitute his wife his agent, and explaining how he came to be suspectand if so, he is bound by her admissions in ed. He gave this letter to the jailer on his
the scope of the agency. The agency, promise to mail it to his wife. The jailer
however, must be established before the instead, opened it and finding what its
admissions can come in."-Wharton on contents were, gave it to the District AtEvidence, 1217. This proposition is sup- torney. The reception of this letter in evported by abundant authority. See Taylor idence was objected to, because of the malion Evidence, 770; Murphy v. Hubert, 16 ner in which it had come to the possession
Pa. 58; Bedfield v. Sanner, 40 Pa. 10; of the Commonwealth. Four weeks after
Cont. Ins. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa. 233: his commitment to the county jail, Tyson's
Butler v. Price, 115 Mass. 578;' Rose v
wife visited him in jail. The neighboring
Chapman, 44 Mich. 312. In the case at cells were all empty, as Tyson knew. The
bar, there is no offer to prove that plain- jailer, before allowing his wife to go to Tytiff's wife attempted to corrupt the witness son's cell, stealthily stationed a man in the
with the authority of her husband.
cell next to that in which Tyson was conThe second offer of the defendant is sus- fined. He thus overheard the conversation
tained, but the evidence proposed by his between Tyson and wife, in which Tyson
first offer is irrelevant and cannot be ad- recited the circumstances of the burning.
initted.
This conversation was received in evidence
TYSON vs. COMIMONWEALTH.
Arson-Evidence-Letterto wife-Conversations.
Error to Superior Court.
MISS JULIA A. RADLE and C. A. SHAMBAUGH for the plaintiff.

I. The evidence of oral confessions of
guilt in criminal cases ought to be received
with great caution.-Taylor on Evidence,
739.
G. L. SCHUYLER and W. J. HENRY for

defendant.
1. A letter written by the defendant
when self-incriminating is prima facie

by the court, on the part of the Commonwealth, as a confession. Conviction. Error to the Superior Court.
OPINION OF THM COURT.

The first error charged against the trial
court, is that it admitted in evidence the
letter of Tyson to his wife. Various objections to the reception of this letter have
been made. (1) It is a confidential conmunication from the husband to his wife.
The wife could not have been compelled,
nor would she have been permitted to
testify to the communication if it had
been oral, nor to produce it before the
court, being written. But, if a stranger had
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overheard the conversation, or secured the against a prisioner, unless they have been
letter, the immunity attaching to the wife delivered under certain circumstances.
would not have attached to him. He
The fact that they are made while in jail
would be compelled to testify. Commondoes not exclude them. Brown v. Comwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181. "A
monwealth, 76 Pa. 319; Commonwealth v.
third person who happened to overhear
Hanlon, 8 Phila. 401, 423; Gray v. Coma confidential conversation between hus- monwealth, 101 Pa. 380. They would be
band and wife, may be examined as to excluded if induced by the hope of benefit
such conversation." 1 Wharton, Evi- for making them, or by fear of disadvandence, par. 427. The circumstance that tage in consequence of refusing to make
the letter was addressed to the wife, would
them. Neither hope nor fear actuated
not, therefore have precluded its use, had it Tyson. He made the statements to his
actually come to the wife. It in fact, wife in the belief that they were heard by
never came to her possession. It was not
her alone. They were in fact overheard.
a communication, but only an abortive at- Had they been overheard by accident the
tempt at communication.
hearer could have testified to them. The
(2) The letter was procured by the fact that he secreted himself, in order to
jailer, by means of an artifice, and by him overhear, and then, for the paltry reward
was put at the disposal of the common- that he could get from the commonwealth
wealth. -Itis howvever, the- policy of the for revealing what he heard, told it to the
law to allow persons accused of crime to officers, did not prevent his testifying to
be tricked in ihis and other ways. De- it in court. Commonwealth v, Goodwin,
tectives obtain their information by all 186 Pa. 218. It is a pity that the state
sorts of devices, on many of which even a feels compelled to encourage petty tricks
very indulgent morality cannot look with on the part of the petty men, whom it
approbation. The prosecution does not, employs to maintain its dignity, but her
for that reason, refrain from using it. In
object is not to be thwarted by the adopRex, v. Derrington, 2 C. & P. 418, a pris- tion by the courts of fastidious rules of
oner in jail on a charge of burglary wrote evidence. The state's business of repressing
to his father, and gave the letter to the crime forbids too great squeamishness as to
turnkey on his promise to mail it. Instead the character of its agents or of their tools
he gave it to the officer. At the trial, it
and methods.
was offered in evidence. Said. Garrow,
The judgment is affirmed.
Baron, "The only cases in which what a
prisoner says br writes is not evidence, are
two ! 1st, where the prisoner is induced to
MARGARET RUPLEY vs. BROWN
make any confession, in consequence of
DAVIDSON, TRUSTEE OF THE ESthe prosecution, etc., holding out any
TATE OF JAMES RUPLEY.
threat or promise to induce him to confess,
and 2d, where the communication is priviTrust deed-Fraudin conveyance.
leged as being made to his counsel or attorney. This not being either of these cases
Al. J. RYAN and H. L. HENDERSON for
I must receive the evidence." Commonthe plaintiff.
wealth v. Goodwin, 186 Pa. 218.
When a husband, on the eve of his marThe second error alleged in the trial is
riage conveys away his property and conthe reception of the conversation between
ceals the fact frbm his intended wife, it
Tyson and his wife injal. What we have was held that the conveyance was fraudulent to her and did not affect her dower.
already said shows that this conversation
Miller vs. Stepper, 32 Mich., 194; Kline's
was not inadmissible, because it was be- Estate, 14 Smith, 122; Baird v. Stearne,
tween husband and wife. The wife could
et al., 12 Weakley Notes, 205.
not have been compelled or allowed tc
W. L. SHIPmAw and C. A. PIPER for
prove it, but a third person might. The the defendant
Anti-nuptial contracts are valid as
conversation is rel vant only because it is
against the widow's dower. Ross's Appeal,
more or less incriminatdry of Tyson. It
127 Pa., 4; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa., 285.
is too well established to need authority,
Widow can only claim dower in property
that self-incriminations are admissible that the husband was seised during cover-
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ture. Dickinson Appeal, 115 Pa.,
Louis v. Louis, 142 Pa. 149.

210;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In 1895 James Rupley became attentive
to Margaret Smith. At that time he was
well known to be possessed of real property
amounting to $100,000, and personal property to the amount of $50,000, which fact
was well known to Margaret Smith. A
few days prior to the engagement, and
after he had explicitly declared to several
people his intent to marry her, he made a
conveyance of all his property to Brown
Davidson, in trust for himself for life, and
after him to the children of a brother.
Margaret Smith married him, being ignorant of the conveyance. In 1897 James
Rupley died. Margaret Rupley files this
bill to annul the trust deed in so far as it
affects the right of the complainant to the
share of the estate to which she would be
entitled, claiming that the conveyance
was a fraud in law upon her just expectations.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We are of the opinion that the plaintiff
is not entitled to the relief prayed for. The
conveyance of the property of James Rupley was made before the marital engageIt does not appear that he had
ment.
made any representations concerning his
property to Margaret Rupley or that she
was induced to enter into the marriage
contract by reason of his possessions.
In this state it is well settled that a man
may do what he pleases with his personal
estate, even after marriage. His wife has no
right in law to interfere. His motive is
immaterial. Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149165. Much less it would seem should
he be denied the right to do so before
even the engagement of marriage. It
surely would not be fraudulent to do secretly at that time what he could do either
openly or secretly after marriage.
The law is different as to the husband's
real estate. His wife has under the law a
This
contingent interest in the same.
cannot be divested by his conveyance alone
after marriage, and it would be fraud on
her to permit him to do so after the marriage contract had been entered into. It
would be fraud upon her to dispose of his
property-certainly if he disposed of a
greater portion than would appear a reas-

onable provision for those depending upon
him including his prospective wife. Had
he by representations as to the amount of
his property induced the plaintiff to enter
into the marriage contract the case might
be differently held, but under the facts of
this case none appear to have been made
to her. We are aware that the conclusion
reached by us, may seem at variance with
a reported decision made by a Common
Pleas Court of this state. But the facts in
that case were very peculiar and our determination was only arrived at after a
careful examination of numerous decisions
of appellate tribunals and we believe it to
be in accord with them. The bill is dismissed with costs.
HOLMES vs. HOOPES.
Determination of lease-Notice of determining a lease-Renewal.
Ejectment.
YEAGER and HEs for plaintiff.
1. A reservation of an annual rent turns
a lease at will into one from year to year.Clark v. Smith, 1 Casey 137; Hey v. McGrath, 81 Pa. 310; 4 Kent's Comm., I1 &
112.
2. Tenant from year to year is entitled
to notice to be given three months before
expiration of current year.-Statute of
Dec. 14, 1863, 112 P. 272; Dumn v Rothermal.
3. Covenant providing for renewals,
will not be construed to create a perpetuity.
-Syms v. Mayer, 105 N. Y. 153; Creighton v. McKee, 7 Phila. 324.
MISS MARVEL and ROTHERMEL for the

defendant.
i. No restrictions upon number and
character of express covenants in a leaseparties by them may change their Conimon Law Liabilities.-Tiedeman on Real
Property, 186; Pilling v. Armitage, 12
Vesey 84; 4 Kent's Comm. 112.
2. Law requires no set form of words to
a covenant-meaning may be implied by
the language used.- Hallitt v. Wylie, 3
Johns (N. Y.) 44; Jackson & Gross Landlord and Tenant in Pa.
3. Covenants for perpetual renewal are
valid when clearly expressed.-Moore v.
Foley, 6 Vesey, Jr., 236; Effinger v. Lewis,
6 Casey 367.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On January 3, 1892, Holmes made a lease
to Hoopes of a house in Shippensburg, for
one year from the 1st of April, 1892, at a
rental of $200, payable quarterly, "with
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privilege of re-renting and remaining on
said premises at same rental and conditions, for any number of years that second
party may desire."
Hoopes took possession, and continued
therein until after January 31, 1899. On
December 26, 1897, he had been notified by
Holmes that the possession would be required on April 1st following, but he declined to surrender the possession. Ejectment.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The lease was made for one year, from
April 1st, 1892, at a rental of $200 per year.
Had it contained nothing more, it would
have been a lease for one year. Hoopes
would have been bound to remove from
the premises, on the April 1st of 1893. He
did not remove however, and Holmes not
objecting, continued to receive the rent, ts
before. This would have made Hoopes a
tenant from year to year, from April 1st,
1893. Oliver v. Budd, 1 Forum 23. In
order to compel him to remove on April 1,
1898, notice three months before, would
have been necessary. Such notice was
actually given slightly more than three
months before, viz., on Dec. 26th, 1897. It
would follow that when this ejectment
was brought, after April 1st, 1898, Hoopes
had no right to retain the premises.
But, the lease while for one year at least
was not merely for one year. The lessee
Hoopes was clothed "with privilege of rerenting and remaining on said premises at
same rental and conditions for any number of years that second party may desire."
Hoopes has desired to remain until now.
He desires still to remain on the premises,
subject to the same conditions, aild paying the same rent. May he do so?
We interpret the lease to confer on
Hoopes the right and duty, to occupy and
pay rent for the premises, for one year, unconditionally, and then, if he chooses, to
occupy and pay rent for them, a second
year; and then, if he chooses, to occupy
and pay rent for them a third year, etc.
If he elects to enter on a year, he compels himself to pay the rent of the entire year, just as a tenant from year
to year does, who enters upon any one
year. Hoopes' position differs however,
from that of a tenant from year to year in
respect to the power of the landlord to

III

terminate his tenancy at the end of any
year. By proper notice, the landlord can,
at the end of any year, cut off the tenant's
right to remain upon the premises. Under the lease from Holmes, Hoopes alone
has the option of determining his tenancy at the expiration of any one year.
A certain hostility has been shown by
some courts to contracts of this sort,
whereby one party is bound by the successive choices of the other.
A'Acovenant
for a lease to be renewed indefinitely at
the option of the lessee is in effect," said
the Supreme Court of California, "the
creation of a perpetuity. It puts it in the
power of one party to renew forever, and
is therefore against the policy of the law."
Morrison v. Rossignol, 5 Calif. 65. While
other courts have a perceptible bias against
interpreting covenants so as to create these
"perpetuities," they almost uniformly
concede that as soon as it clearly appears
that the parties intended to create such
perpetuities, effect must be given to their
intention. In Blackmore v. Boardman,
28 i'fo. 420, there was a lease for 10 years,
renewable at the end of the term on three
months' notice from the lessee, and so on,
indefinitely. Says the court, "As the law
discourages perpetuities, it does not favor
covenants for continued renewals, but,
when they are clearlymade their binding
obligation is recognized and will be enforced." Cf. Reetgers v. Hunter, 6 Johns.
Ch. 215; Foltz v. Huntley, 7 Wend. 210;
Bagnham v. Guy's Hospital, 3 Ves. Jr.,
295; Moore v. Foley, 6 Ves. Jr. 232. In
Lyons v. New York, 105 N. Y. 153, a covenant in a lease for 21 years for "renewals" was held satisfied by two renewals,
so that the lessee was not entitled to a
third. In Carr v. Ellison, 20 Wend. 178,
a lease for 21 years contained a covenant
to renew for 21 years more, under the same
covenants. It was held that the new lease
need not contain in turn, a covenant for a
renewal. See also, Piggot v. Mason, 1
Paige, 412. Kent's summary of the doctrine of the courts may be accepted as
satisfactory. "Covenants for renewal are
frequently inserted in leases for terms of
years, and they add much to the stability
of the lessee's interest and afford inducement to permanent improvements. But,
the landlord is not bound to renew, without a covenant for the purpose, and cove-
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nants by the landlord for continual renewals, are not favored, for they tend to create
a perpetuity. When they are explicit, the
more established weight of authority is in
favor of their validity. These beneficial
covenants to renew the lease at the end of
the term, run with the land, and bind the
grantee of the reversion." 4 Kent, Com.
109; Cf. Willan v. Willan, 16 Ves. Jr. 72,
where Eldon, Lord Chancellor, strongly
asserts the validity of covenants for perpetual renewals.
There are a few Pennsylvania authorities
on the question. A lease was made of certain land for one hundred years, at the annual rental of £3. The lessee was authorized to surrender the premises, if he chose,
at anytime during this term, or to hold
them "as long as he [and they, his heirs]
shall think proper," after the expiration of
the one hundred years: It was held that
the lessee might continue to hold the preniises beyond the oire hundred years. "We
know of nothing in the law of Penn'sylvania," says Porter J., "to prevent us from
saying that he and his successors shall enjoy the benefit of this contract, and keep
the land as long as they pay the rent or at
the very least until compensation for the
improvements thus made has been tendered." Lewis v. Effinger, 30 Pa. 281.
The qualification concerning compensation for improvements was retracted by
Lowrie C. J. when thie case was a second
time in the Supreme Court, in Effinger v.
Lewis, 32 Pa. 367, he saying, "But the evidence of improvements has no influence
on the decision." To the argument that
the right in the lessee to remain indefinitely in possession, without a corresponding
duty to do so, would make the lease unfair
to the lessee, he said that if it was valid, it
would have given the lessee the right to
terminate the lease "at the end of any one
year, for the grantee had that right;" i. e.
at any time within the one hundred years.
In Myers v. Kingston Coal Co., 126 Pa.
582, a lease of coal was made for 20 years
"and for such other and longer time, as
the parties of the second part, and their
legal representatives, shall continue to pay
the rent as named in this inqtrument, unless the term is sooner ended by non-payment of rent as hereinafter provided for."
After the expiration of the 20 years, the
lessor brought ejectment. The right to re-

tain possession depended on the validity
of the clause just quoted. Says Mitchell,
J., "The cases of Lewis v. Effinger, 30 Pa.
281, and Effinger v. Lewis, 32 Pa. 367, settle
the validity of a lease for a term certain,
and thereafter to continue at the will of
the lessee." Cf. Creighton v. McKee, 7
Phila. 324.
If then the parties clearly meant that
Hoopes should have the annual option to
remain for a year, at the original rent,
their purpose will be carried into effect.
The verb to rent is not technical. When
it describes as it does here, the act, not of
the lessor but of the lessee, it means "to
take and hold'under an agreement to pay
rent," International Dict. Hoopes' privilege of re-renting, is that of taking and
holding again under an agreement to pay
rent. His privilege is to re-rent and to remain. The unconditional term of the
lease was one year. The privilege was
that of repeating or renewing this term, as
often as Hoopes fromyear to year desired.
Such we think the interpretation of the
instrument.
Judgment affirmed.

JAMES STEVENS vs. HARRIET
AMOST.
Fraudulent Conveyance-Parol anti-nuptial agreement- Voluntary transferStatutes of frauds in Pennsylvania.
Appeal from lower Court.
E. H. HOFFMAN and J. F. REHM for
the appellants.
1. A voluntary settlement after marriage is fraudulent and void as to antecedent creditors. Though a settlement after
marriage recites a parol agreement entered
into before marriage, it is not, therefore,
good against creditors. Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns Ch. 481; May on Fraudulent
Conveyances365; Thompson v. Dougherty,
12 S. & R., 448; Sexton v. Wheaton, 8
Wheaton 227.
2. To settlement made after marriage, of
course the consideration of marriage does
not extend, so that unless there are other
considerations to support them, they are
regarded as purely voluntary. Wheeler
v. Caryl, 1 Amt. .121; Warden v. Jones, 2
DeG. & J. 76.
ROBERT P. STEWART and CHARLES R.
WEEKS for the appellees.
1. The oral agreement was binding, as
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a marriage settlement need not be in writing in Pennsylvania. 1 Dall. Anon. 1:
Hunt's Appeal, 100 Pa. 596; Lant's Appeal, 95 Pa. 279; Read v. Livingston, 3
John Ch. 481.
2. A promise or contract of settlement
which indues to marriage is binding,
when the marriage is performed against
the settler's creditors in favor of the husband or wife. Magniac v. Thompson, 7
Pet. 348; Jones' Appeal, 62 Pa. 324; ]. ranks'
Appeal, 59 Pa. 190; Tiffany on Dom. Rel.
156.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On 3rd Jaifuary, 1888, James Amost
agreed orally with Harriet that within six
months after their marriage, he' would
convey to her a house and lot in Mechanicsburg. He was, at the time, indebted to
Stevens in the sum of $4,200. The house
and lot were worth $1,500. Amost's other
property, which was all personal, was
worth $1,500. On July 12; .1888, Amost
and Harriet were married, she being in
part induced thereto by his promise to
convey. In pursuance of the agreement,
James Amost conveyed to his wife April
3, 1890. Stevens obtained judgment
against him December 11, 1891, qnd in
May 1892 caused a sheriff's sale of the
houe and lot, becoming the purchaser.
James Amost died in September 1894.
Stevens in this ejectment has recovered
the house and lot. Motion for a new trial.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is a conclusive presumption of the
law that a transfer of property by an insolvent debtor without valuable consideration, is a fraud upon his creditors. This
is so well settled and familiar that authorities need not be cited in its support. In
this case, therefore, the deed from James
Amost to his wife, standing alone, is as
against his creditors, void for want of consideration. But the contention is that the
deed is not to be considered alone;.that its
execution was merely the performance of
an anti-nuptial agreement in parol; that
such anti-nuptial agreement, is valid as
against creditors, and that its performance
cannot be prevented by them. In other
words the defendant relies, and must
necessarily rely, for the validity of her
title, not only upon the deed of settlement,
but upon the anti-nuptial agreement as
well.
That an anti-nuptial settlement is sup-

ported by a good consideration and is valid
against creditors, cannot be doubted.
Frank's Appeal, 59 Pa. 190; Jones's Appeal,
62 Pa. 324; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Peters
347; Prewet v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22. Consequently, if the defendant is permitted to
'prove the anti-nuptial agreement, as well
as the deed executed in pursuance thereof
after the marriage, the fact will be established that the conveyance to her was not
a voluntary one, but one supported by a
consideration, namely marriage, and that
therefore it is impregnable. But if the
anti-nuptial settlement cannot be proved
and the defendant is compelled to rest her
ease on the deed standing alone, it must
be regarded merely as a voluntary transfer
and as no barrier whatever to the assault
of the plaintiff creditor.
The anti-nuptial agreement, as we have
said, was in parol, and it is therefore our
duty to determine whether or not evidence
of its ecistence and its terms was properly
admitted at the trial below.
The question is one that has given rise
to considerable discussion both in England
and America. In England and in nearly
all of the United States, an agreement such
as the one beford us" might be attacked
under two separate provisions of the fourth
section of the statute of frauds, that which
requires agreements in consideration of
marriage to be made in writing, and that
with-reference to the conveyance of land.
The first mentioned provision, however, is
not found in the statutes of Pennsylvania, and it is only as a parol contract affecting the title to land, that the agreenient can be here questioned. Unfortunately, in all of the leading cases in other
jurisdictions, the clause invoked has been
that relating to contracts.in consideration
of marriage. But it makes no essential difference. The statutes deal solely with the
mode of proof, and so long as a particular
contract is within the statute, the requirements of the statute must be met, whether
such contract is one in consideration of
marriage or one that conveys an interest
in land. The contract before us is clearly
within the purview of the Pennsylvania
Statutes, and it follows that the requirement as to its proof is precisely the same
as in the case of any similar contract which
is within the purview of the statute of
frauds, as adopted ift other jurisdictions.
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And that requirement, in Pennsylvania as
elsewhere, is that such agreements must
be evidenced in writing.
We proceed, then, to inquire whether or
not the deed of settlement to the defendant
is a sufficient memorandum in writing of
the anti-nuptial agreement. Or to put it
in another and perhaps clearer way, does
the statute of frauds permit the parol
agreement to be shown in connection with,
and for the support of, a post-nuptial deed
which would otherwise appear to be voluntary and without consideration? On
this point, there was a conflict of judicial
opinion from the time of the enactment of
the statute in England down to a very recent period. May on Fraudulent Conveyances p. 382. In the earlier English cases
there was a strong tendency to regard the
recital of the parol agreement in the subsequent deed as a sufficient memorandum in
writing. But in Warden vs. Jones, 2 De
G. & J. 76. the Court of Appeal, brushing
aside all prior authority, declared: "It
cannot be enough merely to say in writing
that there was a previous oral agreement.
It must be proved that there was such an
agreement, and to let in such proof is precisely what the statute meant to forbid."
Such is unquestionably the law in England
to-day. Trowell v. Thenton, L. R. 8 Ch.
Div. 318: May on Fraudulent Conveyances,
supra. That it is also the law in this
country is evidenced by an abundance of
authority. May, after referring to the view
finally adopted in England; says: "The
same view of this question has, after some
divergence of opinion, been adopted in the
United States and is now there regarded as
settled law." May on Fraud. Conveyances,
383. See also 2 Kent's Com., 173; Story's
Eq. Juris. sec.. 374; Throop on Verbal
Agmts., see. 374; Bump on Fraud. Conveyances (4th Ed.) see. 276; Read v. Livingston, 3 John, Ch. (N. Y.) 481; Flory v.
Houck, 186 Pa. 263.
The case of Read v. Livingston, supra,
is perhaps the leading case in this country,
and the learned chancellor Kent reviews
the authorities at length and announces
his conclusion with convincing force. His
reasoning is adopted by the court of this
state in Flory v. Houck, supra, which is
very similiar to the case before us, and
contains perhaps the latest utterances upon
the point.

We believe our conclusion to be supported by principle as well as authority.
To permit the parol agreement to be shown,
would be in effect to over-ride the statute
of frauds, for it would enable a dishonest
person, by a mere recital in a post-nuptial
settlement, to defeat his creditors. In the
case at hand, the defendant claims title
under a conveyance made for a valid consideration. She cannot prove such a conveyance for a valid consideration except
in a prior parol agreement. And the
proving of a conveyance of land by parol
is just what the statute, in Pennsylvania
as elsewhere, is designed to prevent.
It has not been thought necessary to
discuss the question of performance. Of
course, any act of the defendant's husband
in pursuance of his anti-nuptial promise.
such as the executions of the deed of settlement, would not be a performance of
the agreement, such as would avail the defendant in this action, and the only performance of the anti-nuptial agreement on
her part, was the marriage. And it is settled that marriage is not such a performance of an anti-nuptial agreement as to
place it beyond the reach of the statute.
Flory v. Houck, 186 Pa. 263,and authorities
then cited. The new trial is refused.
WM. SANDERS vs. NORTH AMERICAN INS. CO.
Action in assumpsit on insurancepolicy.
D. F. DEAL and C. C. SLOAN for plaintiff.
Giving notice of cancellation is not of
itself sufficient, but must be accompanied
by tender of the return payment.-Van
Valkenburgh v. Lenox Fire Ins Co., 51
N. Y. 46.5; Lyman v. St. Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 14 Allen 329.
A. W. MITCHELL and L. P. COBLENTZ

for defendant.
The policy is void because it carries the
goods used in an illegal business.-Kelly
v. Home Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 288; Johnson
v. Union Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 127
Mass. 555. The policy was cancelled,Sturgis v. Spofford, 451. Y. 453; 32 Mich.
402.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On January 1, 1898, William Sanderson
insured with the defendant company the
merchandise of a store kept for an illegal
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business, the stock consisting of drugs
and liquors, which he had no permit to
sell. The policy provided that it could be
cancelled on five days' notice and that the
unearned portion of the premium should
be returned when the policy was cancelled.
On July 1st, 1898, the agent of the company
notified the plaintiff that the company
would cancel the policy on July 6th, at 12
noon, and that upon application the unearned premium would be returned. On
August 1st the ;tore burned. The loss on
the goods was $5000, and this suit is
brought to recover that sum. The company contends that the policy on the stock
was illegal because it covered the goods
used in an illegal business, and next that
the policy was cancelled.
Attorneys for the plaintiff insist that
the policy was not cancelled as there was
no tender of a return of the unearned portion of the premium.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant company did not comply
with that provision in the policy of insurance by which it reserved the right to
cancel it upon the return of the premium.
The plaintiff, however, was engaged in an
unlawful business. The courts will not
lend their aid to the enforcement of contracts which would tend in any way to
protect, encourage or foster any immoral or
illegal business.
To hold that the policy attached and was
valid and binding on the company defendant would be to render his illegal business
safe. The case is controlled by the ruling
in Johnson v. Insurance Co., 127 Mass. .555.
We therefore think the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover.
Judgment is entered for the defendant.
COMMONWEALTH vs. JAMES JAMESON.
Divorce- Validity of-Jurisdiction of
court.
STEWART and REHi for plaintiff.

1. In Pennsylvania the right is not recognized to spibject a person in this state
to the jurisdiction of the Divorce Courts of
another.-Ralston's Appeal, 93 Pa. 132;
Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308; Colvin v. Reek,
55 Pa. 375.

2. The subsequent marriage was adulterous.-Com. v. Thompson, 11 Allen 23;
2 Whart. Grim. Law, 496-526.
M EWEN and SHAMEAUGH for defendant.
The divorce was legal in Kansas, and
the Constitution of the United States
makes it incumbent upon the Pennsylvania courts to recognize the decree. See. 1,
Art. 4, Const. U. S.
Personal service upon the respondent
conferred jurisdiction upon the Kansas
courts.-Board of Charities v. Moore, 6 C.
C. Rep. 66; Snyder v. Snyder, 1 W. N. C.

187.

It would be contrary to public policy to
convict the defendant of adultery when
his act is one that the laws of the state
and the decree of a court has expressly
authorized him to do.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Jameson was married October 11, 1891,
in Sewickley, Pa. Six months afterwards
he deserted his wife, and went to Kansas.
In 1894, he instituted proceedings in divorce in Kansas against his wife, the court
obtaining jurisdiction according to the
Kansas law, by publication in a Kansas
paper and in a Sewickley paper for one
month, and also by service of the subpoena
upon Mrs. Catherine Jameson in Sewickley, where she had continued to reside
since the marriage. The court divorced
the libellant and libellee, in 1895. In six
months Jameson came to Pennsylvania
and there married Rebecca Hobson, with
whom he lived for a few months. On an
information, he was charged with adultery, and having been convicted this motion in arrest of judgment is made.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The validity of the divorce depends on
tie jurisdiction of the Kansas court, over
the subject of divorces, and also on its jurisdiction over the persons, both of the
libellant, James Jameson, and, of the
libellee. Its jurisdiction over the subject
is not impugned. Nor can its jurisdiction
over Janieson. He resided in Kansas; and
he applied to its court to dissolve his matrimonial bond. The important question is
whether the court had jurisdiction over
the libellee, irs. Jameson.
Certain states undertake to give to their
courts the power to subject persons not residing nor even being within their territory to their adjudications. Kansas is one
of these. The decree of the Kansas court,
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founded as it is on a service on Mrs. Jameson by publication and by personal service
of the subpcena on her, in Sewickley, is,
within Kansas valid. Within Kansas
James Jameson is not the husband of the
libellee. It is likely that if the libellee
had resided in Kansas, and the libellant
had procured a divorce from her in Pennsylvania, after a service on her similar to
that which was in fact made upon her,
and this divorce had been regarded valid
in Pennsylvania, the Kansas law would
have deemed it valid there also.
But, Pennsylvania does not pretend to
be able to subject persons whd are beyond
its confines, to its jurisdiction. In Ralston's Appeal, ,93 Pa. 132, the husband
lived in Philadelphia, and the wife in
Wilmington, Delaware. The former presented alibel for divorce, which was served
personally upon the latter, in Wilmington.
The court refused to decree a divorce, for
the reason that the respondent had not
been brought within its jurisdiction, as
well as because there was not sufficient
cause.
As our courts decline to divorce respondents who are not upon Pennsylvania territory, so they refuse to recognize the validity
of divorces granted in other states to libellants, from libellees who are within this
state at the inception and during the progress of the proceedings. It is unnecessary
to do more than to refer to Platt's Appeal,
80 Pa. 501; Estate of Peter Fyock, 135 Pa.
522; Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375; Reed v.
Elder, 62 Pa. 308. In Scott v. -Noble, 72
Pa. 115, an action had been commenced in
Massachussets against Grafton and Noble.
When it was made to appear to the court,
that Noble resided and was in Pennsylvania, the court ordered that notice be
given to Noble of the action. The notice
was given, and upon the court's order,
read to him, he endorsed, "I accept service
of the within writ," and went before a justice of the peace and acknowledged that
the endorsement was his. He could scarcely have shown more clearly, his readiness
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts court. That court pronounced
judgment against him. In a subsequent
suit on this judgment, brought in Allegheny county, it was held that the judgment was a nullity. It is not competent
for any state to determine the principles of

jurisdiction that shall bind other states.
Otherwise one state might bring under its
control persons and things that have never
been in it.
-The decree of divorce, was, as to Mrs.
Jameson a aullity. But ,it could not be
void as to her, and valid as to the libellant.
As to both it was, as far as Pennsylvania
is concerned, ineffectual. Jameson was
married October 11, 1891. He is in this
State, still the husband of Catherine who
then became his wife.
It is not necessary to cite authorities for
the doctrine, that a marriage of a person
who at the time. is already the husband or
wife of another, is a nullity. The relations
of James Jameson with Rebecca Hobson
were therefore adulterous. The belief of
Jameson that he was free to marry
again, cannot affect his criminal responsibility.-Commonwealth v. Mash, 7 Metc.
472; Commonwealth v. Thompson, 11 Allen, 23; State v. Whitcomb, 52 Iowa, 85;
2 W!harton Crim. Law, 496-526.
The motion to arrest judgment is overruled. Let the prisoner be brought before
us for sentence.

O'HARA vs. GRAHAM.
Action in tort--Sher ff's duties-Negligence-Proximate and remote causeLiability of public officers.
O'KEEFE and HARPEL for plaintiff.
1. Sheriff had no judicial duties.-1
Mo. 298, State v. Walker & Emmons.
2. Sheriffand his sureties are liable in
damages for breaches of his ministerial
duties.- Weaver v. Commonwealth, 29
Pa. 445.
3. In civil as well as ciiminal cases a
sheriff is obliged to keep a prisoner taken
under an execution in safe and strict custody, and if he allows a prisoner to go at
large for the shortest time without the
plaintiff's consent he is liable.-Brown on
Negligence, Vol. 2, 1560; 6 Johns N. Y.
218, People v. John Wilson; 9 Johns N.
Y. 62, Blanchard v. Cor. Myers.
BOLTE and BUCK for defendant.
1. There was an intervening cause between Graham's act and O'Hara's death
which makes the act of the former remote
and the plaintiff cannot recover from present defendant. Oil Creek & Allegheny
River Ry. Co. vs. Keighron, 74 Pa. 320,U. S. vs. Adams, 74 U. S. 475-62 Pa. 365.
P. R. R. Co. vs. Kerr.
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2. Public officers acting within the scope
,of their authority are not answerable in
damages for the consequences of their acts
unless done negligently and with intent to
injure. Burton vs.Fulton et. al. 49 Pa. 151.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This is an action for damages brought
against Robert Graham, sheriff of Cumberland county, suffered by the plaintiff,
Sarah O'Hara, by reason of the alleged
neglect of the said Graham in permitting
her husband to be lynched by a mob.
William O'Hara, the husband of Sarah,
though innocent, was indicted.for the murder of Oren James. Excitement was high
and the sheriff was advised to remove the
prisoner to another county. Instead of so
doing he put the prisoner in a dilapidated
building attached to the jail. And though
warned that a mob would come to lynch
him, he discharged all the guards, and
when asked delivered up the prisoner to
the crowd without resistance. O'Hara
was taken from the jail and lynched in
the presence of the sheriff, who did not
protest, and the plaintiff suffered damage
to the extent of $10,000.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This cause comes before us on a demurrer to the declaration of the plaintiff. 'We
have considered it with care and have little hesitation in declaring that the facts
set forth by the plaintiff are sufficient, if
true, to constitute a cause of action, and
that therefore tile demurrer cannot besustained.
At the common law no action lies for an
injury to a person which results in his
death. But the right exists by statute in
England and in most, if not all of the
United States. In this state, the enactment provides that "whenever death be
occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence and no suit for damages be brought
by the party injured during his or her life,
the widow of any such deceased, or if there
be no widow, the personal representative,
may maintain an action for and recover
damages for the death thus occasioned."(Act of April 15, 1851, P. L. 669, 19).
Does the conduct of the defendant
amount to "unlawful violence or negligence," within the meaning of the statute?
We believe that it does. He had O'Hara
in his custody and completely under his
control, and if the facts alleged are true,

his actions amply justify a charge, not
only of the most astonishing negligence,
but of wilful and malicious wrongdoing.
When informed of the trouble that was
brewing and advised to remove the prisoner to a place of safety, he refused to do
so. When warned that in all probability
a mob would attempt to take the prisoner
from his custody for the purpose of lynching him, he placed him, not in thestrongest cell in the jail, but in a dilapidated
structure near at hand which would most
readily yield to the assault of the mob.
When the mob came and demanded the
surrender of the prisoner, he delivered
him up without resistance. And when
the unfortunate victim was brutally murdered before his eyes, he stood there, the
representative of the power of the Commonwealth, the chief executive of the
county, and uttered not a word of protest.
Surely, the conclusion is inevitable that
the defendant was in full sympathy with
the mob, if not an active participantin the
perpetration of the crime. Not only is he
guilty, as a sheriff, of utter failure in the
performance of his duty to the State, but
he is guilty as a man, of taking advantage
of his power over a fellow-man, to aid in
depriving him of his life.
The reports of this enlightened commonwealth furnish little aid to the decision of such a case. But the Texas case
of Asher v. Cabell, 1C. C. A. 693; decided
by the United States Court of Appeals, is
almost precisely in point. The defendant
Cabell, a United States Marshall, had in
his custody certain prisoners, one of whom
was Marlow, whose widow is plaintiff in
the action. Great hostility to the prisoner
had been openly manifested by certain lawless persons, and an attack had been made
upon thejall. The defendant was aware
of the attack upon the jail and of the dangerous condition of public sentiment, yet
he committed the custody of the prisoners
to a deputy whom he knew to be an unfit
and improper person, and directed such
deputy to remove them in the night-time
from the jail. As a result, the prisoners
were attacked by a mob and Marlow was
murdered. The action was brought by
his widow Under a Texas statute similar
to the one above recited, and the learned
court held that under that statute, the defendant was responsible in damages for the
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killing of the prisoner in his charge.
"That a United States Marshall," said the
court, "may take prisoners into his custody
*
*
and then negligently and
knowingly deliver them over to incompetent deputies and the known hostility of
mobs, is a proposition which we think
cannot be sanctioned."
The case at bar is much stronger than
the one just referred to. In that case, the
defendant was not present at the time of
the attack upon the prisoners, and his only
negligence was iii the removal of the prisoners under the care of an unfit guard. It
might be urged. and indeed wasurgedin a
dissenting opinion, that the onl3 wrongdoing was that of the deputy, and that the
fault of the defendant was merely one of
judgment. But in the case before us, the
negligence was that of the defendant personally, and is we have said, it was such
gross negligence as to amount in reality to
a wilful and intentional wrong.
In the Maryland case of State v. Wade,
40 L. R. A. 628, it was held in a case similar to the one at bar that the sheriff is not
liable. The learned court distinguishes
Asher v. Cabell as a case in which malicious motives were imputed to the defendant, while in the case before them nothing
was alleged in the declaration that was
inconsistent with the idea of an honest
performance of duty. We think the conclusion of the court was questionable, for
the facts alleged in that case, as in this,
point very strongly to the presence of malice on the part of the defendant. It was
also said in that case-and perhaps this is
the true ground fok the decision-that the
action being one upon the bond of the
sheriff, was ex contractu in its nature,
while the wrong, if any, was in the nature
of a tort. This contention cannot be urged
in the ease before us, as the action is not
upon the sheriff 's bond. But, however,
the Maryland case may be regarded, we
prefer to follow the earlier decision of the
Federal court.
Demurrer over-ruled.

IN RE MARTIN'S ESTATE.
Devise to executor in trust-Duties of executor d. b. n.-Exceptions to auditor's
amount.

W. T.

STAUFFE'R for exceptants.
1. This charity would be enforced in
England by the chancellor under sign
manual of the crown. Blackstone 3 Vol.
p. 47; also 3 Vol. 437. This power is not
recognized in Pa.
2. The power to select the charity never
vested in the executor in trust and therefore did not pass to his successor appointed
by the courts.
3. If discretionary powers are given to
a trustee in a devise the trustee appoihted
by the court cannot exercise those powers.
8 Phila. 211, 3 Mylne and Keen R. 2,37, 17
How. 969.
STATE1ENT OF THE CASE.

In March, 1895, Win. Martin died seized
of real property, which he devised to Hamilton Lare in trust for his son for life, and
after the death of his son, leaving no children, in trust to convert the property
into money, and pay and apply the
same in such amounts and proportions
as he saw fit to suchcharitable institutions
as he should select. In Jan., 1896, the executor died, and in Feb. Walter Hollar was
appointed in his place.
In 1896 the son died and two months
later Hollar, the administrator appointed
by the court, filed an account, in which he
distributed the balance among various
charitable institutions, in accordance with
the will of Win. Martin. Exceptions were
filed by the heirs at law of Martin, which
were submitted to the auditor, who sustained the account. The heirs at law now except to the adjudication of the auditor.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

William Martin's land vested in Hamilton Lare, as trustee, for the testator's
son, during his lifetime, and in further
trust for the children of the son, should
any survive -him. Should no children
thus survive the son, the executor was directed to sell the land. In 1896 the son
died, leaving no children. The executor
having died, his successor has sold the
land, and divided the proceeds among
certain charitable institutions. The heirs
of the decedent, contending that the devise over to the executor, for the purpose
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of sale and division of the proceeds among
charities, was void, insist that the administrator d. b. n. must pay the proceeds to
them.
We are aware of no objection to the testamentary direction to the executor except
that the gift of the proceeds is to indeterminate persons or objects, and for that
reason, cannot be enforced. It is well
settled however, in Pennsylvania, that
when a gift is to charitable institutions, it
will not be invalid, because these institutions are not selected by the testator; and
are to be selected by the ex'ecutor. In
Kinike's Estate, 155 Pa. 101, the will directed the executors "to distribute the
same i. e. the remainder of the estate]
among such charitable institutions, and in
such proportions as they, in their discretion deem proper." The executors selected three charities in the city of Philadelphia to which they awarded the remainder.
Tile exceptions to their account, by the
next of kin, were dismissed. Cf. Witman
v. Lex, 17 S. & R. 88; Pickering v. Shotwell 10 Pa. 23; Croxall's Appeal, 162 Pa.
579; Peacock v. Attorney General 3 Ch.
Div. 343. The law fully authorized the
execution by the executor, ofthe direction
of the testator,
The executor has, however died, and the
court has appointed a successor in the
trust,.Hollar, who has undertaken to execute the power of selection conferred on
the executor. Generally, "courts cannot
confer upon trustees appointed by them
powers which are merely discretionary, or
powers resting on~personal trust and confidence. Hence trustees- appointed by
courts in place of the donees of such powers, cannot execute the powers." 18 Am.
& Eng. Encyc. 970. The rule in England
is different with respect to charities.
"Where property is given to trustees for
such charitable purposes as the testator
shall point out at a future time, and he
dies without appointing any, or for such
charities as the trustees shall designate,
and they die without making any designation, the court will apply the fund cy
pre,."-5 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 938. In
Pennsylvania, and the other states, the
courts have not recognized the doctrine of
cypres.-Methodist Church v. Remington,
I W. 226; Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. 433; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465; Beckman v.

Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298; Fontain v. Ravenal,
17 How. 369, and prior to the enactment
of the 10th Section of the Act of April 22,
1855, 1 P. & L. 540, when the discretion
was given to a trustee to select the beneficiaries of a charity, this discretion if unexercised by such trustee, before his death
or renunciation of the trust, did not devolve upon any successor appointed by the
court; Dunn's Estate, 13 Phila. .395, affirmed in 10 W. N. C. 313; Fontain v.
Ravenal, 17 How. 369; Zeisweiss v. James,
63 Pa. 465; Cf. Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N.
Y. 308.
The 10th section of the act of Apr. 26th,
1855, provides, inter alia,that "no disposition of property hereafter made, for any
* charitable * * use, shall fail for want
of a trustee, or by reason of the objects being indefinite, uncertain, or ceasing or depending upon the discretion of a last trustee * * but it shall be the duty of any
orphan's court * * to apply a trustee
and by its decrees to carry into effect the
intent of the donor or testator, so far as
the same can be ascertained, and carried
into effect consistently with law or
equity." The selection in Dunn's Estate,
supra, by the administrator d. b. n., of
beneficiaries, was invalid, because the
will went into operation prior to 1855. Cf.
also, Mann v. Mullin, 84 Pa. 297; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465. We think it
plain from the provision in the 10th section of the act of 1855, regarding proceedings by the attorney general, that one of
the purposes of the legislature was to confer on the Orphans' and other courts, the
juxisdiction of the chancellor as keeper of
the conscience of the commonwealth (successor'to the king,) asparenspatriac. Cf.
Fontain v. Ravenal, 17 How. 369; nor are
we willing in deference to a dictum in
Zeisweiss v. James, supr*a, to say that the
function thus devolved, "cannot be assumed by the court, for it would not be a
judicial function; nor can it therefore, be
reposed in a trustee or trustees of their selection."
It is well known that thejudicial powers
of the king's courts were derived from
him. A power did not cease to be judicial
in nature, because he chose to reserve to
himself the exercise of it, by his sign
manual; or by the chancellor as his cohscience-keeper. It has long been the usage
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in Pennsylvania to appoint substitutes for
executors and trustees, and to devolve on
them many powers and duties the exercise and performance of which require discretion. To go a little farther, in the same
direction, and to authorize their devolution where a somewhat larger trust was
referred, or where a somewhat more delicate discretion was necessary, is hardly to
pass from judicial to administrative function. Frazer v. St. Luke's Church, 147

Pa. 256; Presbyterian, etc. Missiodis v.
Culp, 151 Pa. 467.
We are of the opinion that under the
tenth section of the act of April 26th, 1855,
the orphans' court had authority to pass
over to the successor to the executor, the
power of selecting the beneficiaries. We see
no reason for disapproving the selection
made by him. The .exceptions to the report of the auditor, are therefore dismissed.

